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PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Melvin G. Dakin*
CIVIL SERVICE
This term was the first in which the courts of appeal were
afforded an opportunity to exercise their newly acquired juris-
diction over direct appeals from the Civil Service Commissions
of the state and of the City of New Orleans.' Limitation of the
review to questions of law, previously a matter of constitutional
provision,2 is now accomplished under rules of court.s
In the main, the cases presented issues as to whether find-
ings were supported by evidence; while it would sometimes ap-
pear that the courts are reviewing these findings broadly under
a "clearly erroneous" rule,4 or at least to the degree permitted
under the "substantial evidence" rule,5 the rule articulated con-
tinues to be that "the findings of fact by the Civil Service Com-
mission where supported by any evidence is binding upon
[the] court and cannot be disputed."'6
Hays v. Louisiana Wild Life and Fisheries Commission7 pre-
sented for judicial clarification a matter of considerable impor-
tance in the interpretation of the immunity provision applicable
to civil service proceedings; it provides an interesting footnote
to the Reed case,8 which reached the court some two years ago.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. In 1958, Article 7, Section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 was
amended so as to specify cases appealable directly to the Supreme Court; since
appeals from the Civil Service Commissions were not included in the specifica-
tion, Article 14, Section 15(o) (1) originally providing for such appeals has been
held impliedly repealed and all appeals perfected subsequent to July 1, 1960
transferred to the docket of the appropriate court of appeal. Hughes v. Depart-
ment of Police, 131 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) ; Burton v. Department
of Highways, 135 So. 2d 588 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
2. LA. CONST. art. 14, § 15(o) (1).
3. Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal, rule XVI(A).
4. See Comment, Administrative Law -Substantial Evidence on the Record
Considered as a Whole, 12 LA. L. REv. 290, 299 (1952).
5. Id. at 294.
6. Knight v. Department of Inst., 140 So. 2d 485, 486 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1962).
7. 136 So. 2d 559 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
8. Reed v. Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Commission, 235 La. 124, 102
So.2d 869 (1958).
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The Wild Life Commission dismissed Hays after he had testi-
fied in Reed's behalf that double reimbursement for travel from
both federal and state governments had been obtained by him-
self and others as well as Reed; the immunity rule9 under which
he testified was said to protect him only against disciplinary
action based solely on the fact that he testified.10 The Civil Serv-
ice Commission upheld this interpretation;" in the court of. ap-
peal's view, however, to hold that. the rule "protected the em-
ployee only from disciplinary action based on his having testi-
fied and not from the content of such testimony is . . . tanta-
mount to declaring the rule totally meaningless and without ef-
fect. 12 The court of appeal consequently reversed the commis-
sion and ordered Hays reinstated. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and affirmed the judgment, 13 noting by way of clari-
fication that an employee was protected from the content of
coerced testimony only in the sense that the statements there
made as to unlawful act could not themselves be used as evidence
of the act but that, if otherwise proved, the act testified to could
be the basis of disciplinary action; as Justice McCaleb rather
laconically put it, "the rule protects relator from being dis-
charged merely because he admitted he did what Reed did but
not because he did what Reed did.' 4
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
The courts of appeal announced several decisions involving
administrative action under the unemployment compensation
provisions; in the main, decisions of the administrative agency
were attacked on the ground that findings of dismissal for mis-
conduct or findings of leaving employment without good cause
were unsupported. 15 The courts of appeal are guided, in review
of such decisions, by a statutory directive that "the findings of
the board of review as to the facts, if supported by evidence and
in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction
9. Civil Service Rules, art. 13.25(b): "Any officer or employee required to
testify as herein authorized shall not be subjected to any disciplinary action by
his appointing authority because of his giving such testimony."
10. 136 So. 2d at 560.
11. Id. at 561.
12. Id. at 565.
13. Harp v. Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Commission, 243 La. 278, 143
So. 2d 71 (1962).
14. Id. at 73.
15. E.g., Green v. Brown, 136 So. 2d.147 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Friloux v.
Administrator, Div. of Empl. Sec., 136 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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of the :court shall be confined to questions of law."16 Such con-
clusiveness will be accorded to findings, however, only if there
has been a fair hearing with the employee having notice of the
specific conduct relied upon to establish ineligibility; in the mis-
conduct cases, for example, the misconduct charged must be the
misconduct finally relied upon by the Board of Review to sus-
tain its determination. 17
As to the evidence necessary to sustain a finding of fact, the
unemployment compensation statute was amended in 1958 to
require "sufficient evidence.""' Previous to the amendment, the
"supported by legal, competent, and sufficient proof" ;19 whether
the legislature meant not to limit evidence to "legal or compe-
tent" evidence by including only "sufficient" in the amendment
is not clear. The courts of appeal continue to apply their re-
quirement of findings "supported by legal, competent, and suf-
ficient proof. '20
On questions of law, the courts of appeal have felt entirely
free to substitute judgment for the agency on interpretation;
"misconduct," for example, has been interpreted to require
"more than mere inefficiency, or unsatisfactory conduct . . . on
the other hand, the repeated and deliberate violation ... of an
employer's reasonable instructions may be disqualifying conduct
... as may be a single deliberate violation of a safety rule which
endangers the lives of co-employees and the property of the em-
ployer."2'
In the Third Circuit, suits seem to be brought against the
administrator personally, whereas in the Fourth Circuit suits are
styled against the holder of the office of administrator; the lat-
ter would seem preferable in order to avoid problems of abate-
ment which have arisen in the federal courts.2 2 The Federal
Rules have recently been amended to avoid cases of extreme
hardship in which failure to timely file motions to substitute
defendants have resulted in the suit abating.28
16. LA. R.S. 23:1634 (1950).
17. Johnson v. Brown, 134 So. 2d 388, 390, 391 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
18. LA. R.S. 23:1634 (1950) as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 523.
19. Burge v. Administrator, Div. of Empl. See., 83 So. 2d 532, 533 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1955).
20. Huddleston v. Brown, 124 So. 2d 225, 226 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
21. Turner v. Brown, 134 So. 2d 384, 387 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
22. Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15 (1950).
23. FicD.: R. Civ. Paoc. 25(d).
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SCHOOL BOARDS
In the school board cases that come to the courts of appeal,
the statutory restraints on judicial review are not present to the
same degree as in civil service and unemployment compensation
cases. The district court must conduct a "full hearing to review
the action of the school board," but it can hear evidence in addi-
tion to the record evidence before the school board if the peti-
tioning teacher chooses to introduce it.2 4 On appeal to a court
of appeal, review is also on law and fact, since the statute grant-
ing review of school board action does not make the agency's
determination final in any respect.25 However, one court of ap-
peal has deemed itself bound by the rule set forth in the Lewing
case26 providing that "when there is rational basis for an ad-
ministrative board's discretionary determinations which are
supported by substantial evidence insofar as factually required,
the court has no right to substitute its judgment for the admin-
istrative board's or to interfere with the latter's bona fide exer-
cise of its discretion. ' 27 We have no indication yet what the
formula will yield when there is not "substantial" evidence; in
federal agency review, the Supreme Court has said that "if the
findings of the [agency] . . . are supported by [substantial]
evidence the courts are not free to set them aside, even though
the [agency] . . . could have drawn different inferences ...
The possibility of drawing either of two inconsistent inferences
from the evidence did not prevent the [agency] . . . from draw-
ing one of them. '28 Under this rule, mere disagreemnt with the
agency's findings will not suffice if the agency's discretion has
been validly exercised in choosing between two conclusions, each
of which has persuasive support; the agency must have chosen
a conclusion which does not have persuasive support for the
court to interfere under the substantial evidence rule as so
interpreted. 29
While the district court hearing seems more important in the
school board cases than in the unemployment compensation
cases, since additional evidence may be taken under the school
board statute, it seems arguable that direct appeal to the courts
24. Lewing v. DeSoto Parish School Board, 238 La. 43, 113 So. 2d 462 (1959).
25. LA. R.S. 17:443 (1950).
26. 238 La. 43, 113 So. 2d 462 (1959).
27. Singleton v. Iberville Parish School Board, 136 So. 2d 809, 814 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1962).
28. NLRB v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105, 107 (1942).
29- Comment, 12 LA. L. Rav. 290, 300-01 (1952).
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of appeal, with the possibility of certiorari to the Supreme
Court, might in both types of cases be appropriately considered;
in this regard, the civil service pattern of review, bypassing the
district courts, seems to be functioning satisfactorily and is pre-
sumably conserving both judicial and lawyer time.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
The expanded jurisdiction of the courts of appeal over re-
view of administrative action does not include appeals from
orders of the Public Service Commission; the recent constitu-
tional amendment, which so substantially altered the flow of
appellate work into the courts of appeal, left undisturbed the
progression of review from the Commission through the district
court to the Supreme Court.30 One of the reasons may have been
that at the district court level the case may be tried de novo,
although usually confined to evidence introduced before the
Commission ;31 new evidence, unless stipulated to the contrary
by the parties, must be referred to the Commission for consider-
ation in relation to the order under review before a district court
may proceed to judgment.32 Increasingly, however, trial court
proceedings have tended to consist of review on the record as
made before the Commission but, of course, with full substitu-
tion of judgment possible under a statute which permits the
court to "affirm the order of the Commission ... or... change,
modify, alter, or set it aside, as justice may require. '33
Recent action by the Supreme Court in a "station-closing"
case from the Commission would seem to strengthen further the
role of the trial court as an appellate tribunal rather than as a
trier of fact in any original sense.34 The action in question was
a remand from the Supreme Court directly to the Commission
for the purpose of taking further evidence in a "station-closing"
case ;35 the trial court was simply reversed and not otherwise
included in the directive although, since the case was not held
on the docket of the Supreme Court, it would presumably return
to the district court on subsequent appeal from any new Com-
30. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(3), as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 561,
adopted Nov. 4, 1958.
31. LA. R.S. 45:1192 (1950).
32. Id. at 45:1194.
33. E.g., Southern Bell Tel & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 15
P.U.R.(3d) 328 (Dist. Ct. 1956).
34. Gulf, Col. & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv.. Comm'n, 243
La. 290, 143 So. 2d 75 (1962).
35. 143 So. 2d at 79.
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mission order. The remand was ordered under the authority of
Article 2164 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing: "The ap-
pellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and
proper upon the record on appeal." There was no disagreement
among the court as to the remand procedure; only the substan-
tive need for it was questioned, on the ground that no sufficient
case had been made for the inadequacy of the present record and
the consequent need for the taking of further evidence.3 6
With the role of the trial court thus firmly delineated as pri-
marily appellate in Commission cases, one may speculate
whether another constitutional amendment may not be in order,
shifting Commission appeals from the trial court to the appro-
priate court of appeal, with only supervisory and certiorari
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. Since the direct supervisory
power of the appellate courts to stay orders would not extend to
Commission orders, injunctive relief and hence resort to the dis-
trict courts would still be occasionally necessary; however, re-'
view of a considerable array of administrative orders would
seem feasible by appeal directly from the Commission to the ap-
propriate court of appeal as in the case of Civil Service Com-
mission matters.
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL BOARD
The power of the supervisory writ was well illustrated in a
recent Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control case coming up to
the First Circuit Court of Appeal.3 7 The legislature has pro-
vided that permit revocation orders of both municipal governing
bodies and Board of Tax Appeals may be appealed to a district
court only devolutively; thereafter if a district court refuses re-
lief, a further devolutive appeal is provided to the appropriate
court of appeal .3  However, if writs are applied for, the revoca-
tion may be stayed, pending consideration by the court of ap-
peal, thus achieving a suspensive appeal despite the statute.3 9
In the case under review, the proprietress of a tavern had
1.36.:.Id;, Justice McCaleb dissenting, at 80.
37. Allen v. Louisiana Board of Alcohol Beverage Control, 141 So. 2d 680
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
38. LA. R.S. 26.302. 33:4788 (19-50).
39. 141 So. 2d at 681.
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her liquor license revoked by municipal authorities ;40 she none-
theless successfully achieved a stay of the revocation pending
determination of the constitutionality of the statute conferring
revocation powers.41
The case is significant also for reaffirming an important
point of enforcement practice, namely, that the legality of a
revocation does not become moot upon the expiration of the
permit year.4 2 Here, the proprietress, after achieving a stay of
the revocation of her current permit, despite denial of instant
relief by the trial court, routinely applied for issuance of license
and permit for the following year. The Louisiana Board of
Alcoholic Beverage Control, alerted to the city's revocation
move, countered by setting a hearing at which proprietress was
charged with defending her right to maintain her licenses and
permits. Proprietress then went to a district court and success-
fully enjoined the Board from holding its hearing pending the
outcome of the revocation proceedings. She moved to dismiss
the appeal taken by the Board on the ground that, since the year
had expired which the revoked license had covered, the hearing
order was moot. The court of appeal refused to dismiss, noting
that expiration of the year covered did not moot the issue since,
under the statute,48 an applicant for a permit may not have had
a previously-held permit revoked within one year prior to the
application; thus failure successfully to defend her license
against revocation for the expired year could be a determining
factor in obtaining a renewal of the license for the subsequent
year.44
Here, again, as in the school board and public service com-
mission cases, one can speculate whether direct review of the
board's orders by the court of appeal, encompassing as it does
review of both law and fact, and subject as it is to certiorari
from the Supreme Court, would provide adequate safeguards,
without the present provision of a trial de novo at the district
court level.
40. LA. R.S. 33:4785 (1950).
41. 141 So. 2d at 681.
42. Id. at 682.
43. LA. R.S. 26:79A(6) (1950).
44. 141 So. 2d at 681, 682, citing Barretta v. Cocrehan, 210 La. 55, 26 So. 2d
286 (1946).
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